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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

During the entire course(s) of appellant's representation
on all previous"POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION(s)" the District
Court appointed a total of seven (7) attorneys to litigate
the procedures. Each and every appointed attorney provided
noting more than "ineffective assistance of counsel" which
resulted in appellant's POST-CONVICTION APPLICATIONS being
subjected to "SUMMARY DISMISSAL" in violation of the appellant's
constitutional rights under both the federal and state constitutions.

U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1,§13.

on October 22,2013, the appellant filed his [prose]
"SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION" and
"MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF."
On December 13,2013, the District eourt issued its "ORDER
DENYING MOTION AND NOTICE OF INTENT TO DISMISS" and "FINDINGS
REGARDING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL ON SUCCESSIVE
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF."
On December 30,2013, the appellant filed his [prose]
"PETITION FOR RECONSIDERATION."
On January 5,2014, the Bistrict eourt issued its "ORDER
DENYING MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" and "ORDER DISMISSING
PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF."

On January 23,2014, the appellant filed his [prose]
NOTICE OF. APPEAL."

APPELANT'S BRIEF

1•

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1.

Did the district court err in dismissing the appellant's

"PETITION FOR SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POST-CONVICTION APPLICATION?"
2.

Did the district court err in dismissing the appellant's

"MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL?"
3.

Did the district court err in dismissing·the appellant's

"MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION?"
4.

Did the district court err in its determination the

appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of conviction with false evidence? 11
5.

Did the district court err in its determination the

appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of ineffective assistance,attorney misconduct, conflict of interest,
and prejudice through appointed trial/defense counsel?
6.

Did the district court err in its determination the

appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of prosecutorial misconduct and subordinate perjury during the prosecution?
7.

Did the district court err in its determination the

appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of perjury
by the state's make-or-break/star witness?
8.

Did the district court err in its determination the

appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of the
state subjection of an unfair trial?

2.

9. Did the district court err in its determinations the
·appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflict of
interest, and prejudice through appointed direct appeal counsel?
10.

Did the district court err in its determinations the

appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of the
state's destruction of physical evidence in bad faith?
11.

Did the district court err in its determinations the

appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflcit
of interest, and prejudice through all seven (7) appointed postconviction relief counsel?
12.

Did the district court err in its determinations the

appellant failed to state a claim to the allegations of
waiver?
13.

Did the district court err in its determinations the

appellant failed to bring his claims within his second or successive post-conviction application within a timely manner?
14.

Did the district court err in its determinations the

appellant failed amply litigate cumulative effect(s)?
15.

Did the district court err in its determinations the

appellant failed to amply litigate fundamental error?
16.

Did the district court err in its determinations the

3.

to deny an evidentiary hearing at least -- in to the "waiver"
rights?
17.

Did the district court err in its determinations on

appellant's allegations without researching the court transcript(s)?
18.

Did the district court err in its determinations on a

failure to litigate allegations that could have been brought
in either [direct appeal] or [p]revious [post-conviction applications] -- regardless of the material fact that the appellant alledged ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflict of interest, and prejudice from [all] appointed counsel(s)?
19.

Did the district court err in its determinations that

the appellant failed to litigate any [new claims] that have never
been [a]djudicated in a court of law -- regardless of the claims
of ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflict of interest, and prejudice from [all appointed counsel(s)]
through the [direct appeal] and [post-conviction application(s)]?
20 •. Did the appellant failed to bring his second or successive
post-conviction application -- in a timely manner allotted by
state law(s)?

The appellant respectfully contends that these above twenty
(20) issues/questions -- are indeed controlling constitutional
issues.within litigation(s) of this case before the court.

4.

ARGUMENTS

I.

The appellant asserts that the reason(s) he failed to raise

the issues contained within his "SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION" and "MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF" was strictly due to the material and
controlling factor(s) that -- all previously appointed counsel
failed to litigate any of those issues which are now brought
before either the district court, or this court.
From [direct appeal] to all previous [post-conviction applications], the appellant suffered the inapt representation(s)
from

appointed counsel by the district court and not one single

educated attorney has ever litigated the contained constitutional
issues/violations which the appellant has strived to litigate
before any court of law.
Furthermore, not one single appointed attorney ever took the
time or opportunity to [c]onsult with the appellant and [d]iscuss any issue(s) which the most meritorious argument(s) and it
took the appellant (with the assistance of jailhouse~lawyers)
months to actually uncover these most vital constitutional
issues and violations which the appellant has {now) attempted
to bring to light before any court of law in the state of
Idaho.
None of the strong issues which previous co.unsel [omitted]
were ever "waived" by the appellant, let alone "discussed"
with appellant at any time(s) during the course(s) of representation(s).

s.

The appellant respectfully asserts that "just the claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflict
of interest, and prejudice" displayed from [all] appointed
attorneys -- combined with the constitutional ciaim(s) of being
"convicted with false evidence" would amply suffice to warrant
an evidentiary hearing on the merits.
The omission(s) of vital constitutional violations were never
-- an active,

or

knowing choice made by the appellant through any

appointed attorney, and would lawfully provide sufficient reason(
1

s)

for permitting the newly asserted allegations contained throughout
his POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION, MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF, and all attached EXHIBITS -- to be raised
in the instant course(s) of (prose) litigation.
A claim of ineffective assistance of [appellate counsel]
coupled with ineffective assistance of prior [postconviction
counsel] -- provides sufficient reason(s) to permit newly
asserted (prose) allegations to be raised in a subsequent postconviction proceeding.

Palmer v. Dermitt, 102 Idaho 591, 635

P.2d 955 (1984).
Prior to dismissing petition for postconviction relief,
district court [is required] to [o]btain portion to trial transcript(s) as is [necessary] to [d]etermination on the [b]asis
of [application], answer or motion, and [record], that there
are [n]o [material issues of fact] and that petitioner is [not]
entitled to postconviction relief.

I.e.

§19-4906(b).

v. State, 1992, 122 Idaho 801, 839 P.2d 1215.
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.

Matthews

Const. Art. 1,§13;

(emphasis in original).

Issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but

6.

was not, is forfeited and may not be considered in postconviction
proceedings, [u]nless it appears to court that asserted basis
for relief raises substantial doubt about the reliability of
finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence,
have been presented earlier.

I.C. §19-4901(b).

Gonzales v. State,

1991, 120 Idaho-759, 819 P.2d 1159; Hedger v. State, 1993, 124
Idaho 49, 855 P.2d 886.
Appellant respectfully asserts that at no time(s), did any
[appointed counsel] ever

bring to light or the_ attention of the

appellant (either on direct appeal, or on postconviction application( s-)) that:
1 .)

Appellant was provided with [nothing] but [i]neffective

assistance of counsel, attorney misconduct, conflict of interest,
and prejudice under the Strickland standards, ~swell as,
2.)

Appellant was unconstitutionally [co"nvicted] with [f]alse

testimony/evidence under the Giglio and Napue standards.
also I.R.P.C. RULES - 1 .3. Diligence

&

(see

Commentary [1 ]; 1 .4. Com-

munication & Cmmentary [11,[5]&[7] and see 1 .0. Terminology Commentary - Informed Consent [6],[7]

(emphasis in [6] " ..•. , a

lawyer who does not personally [inform] the [client] or other
person ]assumes] the risk that the client or other person [is]
[I]nadequately -- [i]nformed and the [consent] is [invalid]."
Therefore, while ordinarily a client is bound by the attorney's
actions, an [attorney] may [not -- waive] a [fundamental right]
of the [client] -- [without the client's informed -- consent].
Const. Art. 1,§13; u.s.c.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; State v. Lapage,
1981, 102 Idaho 387, 630 P.2d 674, cert. denied 102 s.ct. 606,
454 U.S. 1057, 70 L.Ed.2d 595; I.R.P.C. 1.0. - Commentary;Informed Consent [6]&[7].

(emphasis in originals).

7.

II.

FALSE TESTIMONY, FALSE EVIDENCE, PERJURY, and SUBORDINATE
PERJURY.

In Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 79 S.Ct. 1173, 3 L.Ed.2d
1217 (1959) the Court held "a conviction obtained through use of
false evidence, known to be such by the representatives of the
State, [must fall] under the Fourteenth Amendment." Napue, 360
U.S. at 269.

"A claim under Napue will succeed when '(1) the

testimony (or evidence) was actually false,

(2) the prosecution

knew or should have known that the testimony was actually [false],
and (3) the [false testimony] was [material]." It is "irrelevant
whether the defense knew about the false testimony and failed to
object or cross-examine the witness, because the defendant Ycan
[not waive a freestanding ethical and constitutional obligation]
of the prosecutor as a representative of the government to protect
the integrity of the court and the crimi'nal system." The same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false evidence, allows it to go [uncorrected] when it appears.

Id.,at 269.

(emphasis in original).
In Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103,112, 55 s.ct. 340,342, 79
L.Ed. 791

(1935) the Court made clear that "deliberate deception

of a [court] and [jurors] by the prosecution of known false evidence is incompatible with 'rudimentary demands of justice'."
U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14; const. Art. 1,§13. (emphasis in original).
Appellant asserts that -- during the litigation (attempts) of
his [prose] SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION
arguments were (attempted to be) made alleging the conviction
through false testimony/evidence and during the litigation (attempts) of his [prose] MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POSTCONVICTION RELIEF -- additional .
8.

arguments were (attempted to be) made alleging supportive claims
to the conviction with false evidence/testimony ( see MEt10RANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPO~T OF POST-CONVICTION RELIBF, pp. 17-47; 66-203;
217-225).
Appellant also alleged throughout his [prose] pleadings how
"at no time, did the prosecution, advisory witnsss {state), nor
defense counsel ever -- move to [enter] the POLICE REPORTS,
MEDICAL REPORTS, or STATEMENTS into evidence and either 'direct
examine' or 'cross-examine' the state's make-or-break/star
witness before the [court] or [jury] over all of her inconsistencies compared to [eJvidence gathered during previous course(s)
of investigation procedures."
The POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS, ST~TEMENTS (witnesses),
and further EXHIBITS were attached to the.MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN
SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICITION RELIEF and the distri.ct court clearly
disregarded such allegations, or sripportive evidence while
DISMISSING the appellant's SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION
APPLICATION and MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF pleadings.
The appellant asserts that there are at least two (2) lawful
controlling matters to the above allegations:
1 .)

The Supreme Court has held" ••• we may use (appellant's)

brief (MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF)
to clarify allegations in (his) complaint (POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION) whose meaning is unclear." Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S.
211,230, 120 s.ct. 2143,2155, 147 L.Ed.2d 164 c2000).
2.)

The appellant asserts that "where the state's [a]dvisory

witness (whom was in fact the primary police investigation(s)
officer of the ·alleged crime) sits in the courtroom listening to

9.

any and all testimony from the state's make-or-break/star witness
(and all other testimony) and also [compiled] pertinent evidence
from the state's make-or-break/star witness and holds personal
knowledge that indeed the state's make-or-break/star witness [is]
testifying falsly, as an agent/representative of the prosecution's
team, this very same advisory witness (state's) owes the couri,
the jury, and the appellant the constitutional duty to -- notify
the prosecutor or anyother representative of the court and jury
to -- confrontation against the state's make-or-break/star witness and assist either the prosecution -or- defense counsel in
impeaching the [witness] for testifying falsely and openly committing perjury before the court and jury.

see I.R.E. 615(a)(3);

State v. Ralls, 111 Idaho 485, 725 P.2d 190 (1986); Labelle v.
State, 130 Idaho 115, 937 P.2d 427 (Ct. App. 1997). Const. Art.
1,§13; u.s.c.A. Const. Amend. 14. see also I.e.§§ 18-5401, 18-,
5407, 18-5409, 18-5412, 18-5413, and 18-5414. see also MEMORANDUM
OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, pp. 24(~1), 29(TI~
1-2), 75, 105-106(ff1) ,and MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, pp.12(ff2),
13(ffff3&4), 15(1.-5), 19(ff2), 22(ffff3-4), 27(ffff3-4) .
. "A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it is in
any way relevant to the case, the district attorney has the responsibility and [duty] to [correct] what he knows to be [false]
and elicit the [truth]."

Mariana Islands v. bowie, 243 F.3d

1109,1115 (9th Cir. 2001)(quoting Napue, 360 U.S., at 269-270).
Appellant clearly alleged to the district court that "indeed
the- prosecutor, advisory witness (state's), and defense counsel
[h]ad in their [p]ossession(s) -- all relevant POLICE REPORTS,
MEDICAL REPORTS, and STATEMENTS (from material eye witnesses)
and thereby held firsthand knowledge that the state's make-orbreak/star witness was indeed -- committing perjury and providing
false testimony to both the court and jury.

1 0.

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, pp.
22-29, 104-121, 162TI2-225; MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, pp. 5fffi
3-4, 12ffff1-2, 15ff3, 19ff2, 22H2-23ff2, 24-32).
Appellant asserts that "at no time did the district court
take in to consideration that the appellant was contending that
he was convicted through false evidence/testimony and absolutely
none of the representatives of the law bothered to lawfully do
anything about this unconstitutional matter."
Yet, the district court DISMISSES THE ACTION.
The appellant respectfully asserts that the POLICE INVESTIGATION REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS,. STATEMENTS (material eyewitnesses)
were indeed lawfully BRADY violations on the part(s) of the prosecutor.and the adivisory witness (state's) .and indeed were also
"MATERIAL" evidence in the defense of the appellant. Thereby,
the state violated the appellant's constitutional rights under
the clearly established laws of Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419,
131 L.Ed.2d 490, 115 s.ct. 1555 (1995); United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 87 L.Ed.2d 481, 105 s.ct. 3375; Napue v. Illinois,
360 u.s. 264, 3 L.Ed.2d 1217, 79 s.ct. 1173 (1959); Banks v.
Dretke, 540 u.s. 668, 157 L.Ed.2d 1166, 124 s.ct. 1256 (2004);
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 83 S.Ct. 1194
(1963); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 31 L.Ed.2d 104,
92 s.ct. 763 (1972).

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-

CONVICTION RELIEF,pp. 162-225). (emphasis in pleading).
Furthermore, the appellant asserts that "where defense counsel
plays an active role in the suppression of exculpatory and
material evidence, defense counsel surely must have violated
his client's (appellant's) constitutional rights under the
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clearly established law(s) from the Supreme Court under the
Strickland standards, as well as, the IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT. Rules PREAMBLE: A LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES -

[2] ''as

advocate, a lawyer zealously asserts the client's position under
the rules of the adversary system.", [9] " .•• These principles
include the lawyer's obligations, as an advocate, to zealously
protect and pursue a client's legitimate interests within the·
bounds of the law and, as an officer of the court, to preserve
the integrity of the legal system's search for the truth while
maintaining a professional, courteous and civil attitude toward
all persons involved in the process."

(emphasis in originals).

see also, MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,
PP. 231-2411, 29~30111-3, 1.05-10611. (emphasis in pleading).
Had either the prosecutor, advisory witness (state's), or
appella~t's defense counsel presented the POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL
REPORTS, STATEMENTS (eyewitnesses), etc. to the court or jury
and moved to IMPEACH the state's make-or-break/star witness -there would surely, have been a different [o]utcome of the trial
and unconstitutional conviction the app~ll~nt has been forced to
endure all of these years behind prison walls

&

fences.

Never -- has the Supreme Court, or the State Supreme Court held
that both the prosecution and defense counsel can "suppress
exculpatory and material evidence from the defendant, the court,
or the jury and obtain any conviction through the useage of a
state's make-or-break/star witness' false testimony and false
evidence."
Yet, the record clearly reflects this.
And the district court DISMISSES this action as well.

1 2.

Appellant further asserts the district court based one of its
determinations on a single allegation that the litigant was
attempting to "relitigate the issue that the state's make-orbreak/star witness only testified [falsely] on 'how much alcohol
she consumed'."

(see FINDINGS REGARDING MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF

COUNSEL ON SECOND OR SECCESSIVE PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RE
LIEF,p.2(f[3) -- "As a further example, the petitioner reiterated
his prior claims regarding the amount of alcohol the victim had
consumed on the night of the incident .... ").
However, had the district court referred to the [c]umulative
[new] allegations/claims contained throughout the MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, there lies an [abundance]
of additional allegations/claims which absolutely [no] appointed
counsel (in either the direct appeal -or- previous postconviction
application(s)) ever bothered to raise before any court(s).
Those add~tional controlling constitutional allegations/claims
entailed the following [i]nconsistent matters:
(a.)

The state's make-or-break/star witness testified before

the court(s) and [jury] that ~[SJhe [never] left Chiller'~ Bar the
entire day/night and she only [c]onsumed two (2) Bloody Marys the
[entire time]."

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-

CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.32(,t19), 46(,tS), 119(,tI.), 122(,t2), 91
[questions & answers]); see also TRIAL TRANSCRIPTS,p.335,Ls.71 0) ) •

However, there is indeed, material and inculpatory evidence
which was gathered by the police investigator(s) that lawfully
(disputes] this controlling untruthful matter/factor.

(see

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.21 (,t4),
30(,t,t2&4),77(B.)-80(,t1),87,89-91 {questions & answers),93-95,110
(,t,t3&4),114(A.),142(d.),144(,t,t2-3),205(2)(emphasis on ,rs).
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(b.). The state's make0or0break/star witness clearly testified
before the court(s) and [jury] to numerous inconsistent versions
of how "[S)he [exited the vehicle] after arrival at the residence."
(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.24
(~),28,100(A.-C.),152(10.)-159(i.),161(6.),164(ff4)-169(1.),171-174,
1 a1 < m11 - s , , 1 91 < ng. > , 1 9 s > •
The appellant asserts that "there cannot be so 'many various ,and
inconsistent versions' --to-- one (1) single event." Therefore,
which version is the [jury] to believe as the [truth} and which
remaining version was the [lie]?

The Supreme Court has never held

that a single witness may provide various and inconsistent testimony/evidence and this pertinent constitutional violation(s) will
be -- overlooked.
(c.)

Napue, 360 I.S., at269-270.

(emphasis in original).

The state's make-or-break/star witness clearly testified

before the court(s) and [jury] on how "[S]he received a phone call
from her [husband] while in route to the residence."

(see MEMORANDUM

OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.23(ff8.)-24(ff1),32(ff
18~),37(24.),66(ff5)-68,96-99(ffff1-3),139,145-147,150(ffff1-3).
The appellant clearly litigated to the district court that "This
/~--

particular event/incident proclaimed-~ si virtually [i]mpossible,

"

./

yet, defense counsel never once bothereato [fully investigate]
the claimer, or even [subpoena] the proclaimed [husband] to testify
before the court and [jury] on said incident."
Again "A lie is a lie, no matter what its subject, and, if it
is in [any way] relevant to the case, the district attorney [has]
the responsibility and [duty] to [correct] what he knows to be
[false] and [elicit the truth]."
360 U.S., at 269-270.

Bowie, 243 F.3d at 1115; Napue,

(emphasis in original). U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.

14; Const. Art. 1,§13.
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Appellant respectfully asserts that there are [numerous] other
[false testimony/evidence] contained throughout the MEMORANDUM OF
LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF which the district court
elected to [not] take into consideration before making the determination(s) to "Deny" -- APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL and SECOND OR
SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION and further DISMISSED all
pleadings presented (prose) for adjudication on the [merits].
Where the district court is [required] to [refer] to the allegations/claims and transcript(s) on record in the determination(s)
of lawful proceedings, the actions of the district court must
surely support the [opposite].

Const. Art. 1,§13; u.-s.c.A. Const.

Amend. 14.
The Idaho Supreme Court has held "It is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a defendant [has a fair trial], and that nothing
but [competent evidence] -- is -- submitted to the [jury]." State
v. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35,44, 71 P. 608,611

(1903). They should not

"exert their skill and ingenuity to see how far they can trepass
upon the verge of error, because generally in so doing they transgress upon the [rights of the accused]." Id. see also State v.
Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,469, 163 P.3d 1175,1181

(2007).

(emphasis in original). Const. Art. 1,§13; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend.
1 4.

Appellant respectfully asserts that the [pleadings] filed before
the district court in his SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION
APPLICATION and MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF allege numerous claims on the [incompetent] evidence that
was unlawfully used in the trial and eventual conviction and at
no time(s) did the district court address any of those pertinent
unconstitutional matters.

1 5.

III.

BRADY VIOLATION(S).

The appellant asserts that throughout all of his pleadings
filed before the district court contained numerous allegations/
claims of the unconstitutional BRADY violations which he was
forced unconstitutionally to suffeL from the hands of both the
prosecutor and state's advisory during the course(s) of his
trial and eventual conviction.
The appellant argued before the district court that "where
the state's [advisory witness] was ·indeed the primary police
investigator in the alleged crime(s) and constructed the report
that contained the most [i]nculpatory evidence on the state's
make-or-break/star witness -- and the most [e]xculpatory evidence for the benefit of the defendant/appellant and where the
state's [advisory witness]

[sat] befo~e the court and jury knowing

full well that the state's make-or-break/star witness was providing nothing more than ffalse testimonyj in order to create the
[evidence], said advisory witness [owed] the defendant/appellant
the [duty] to bring this unlawful matter to the attention(s) of
the prosecutor, the court, and the [jury] -- and to assist in the
IMPEACHMENT of the state's make-or-break/star witness is a lawful
representative of the prosecutions team and under clearly established law( s). '.:

( see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-

CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.75fffl3-6)-203 [especially p.75(ffff2-5) to
203]). see also Maxwell v. Roe, 628 F.3d 486,507-508 (9th Cir.
2010); Hall v. Director of Corrections, 343 F.3d 976,978,984-985
(9th Cir. 2003); Killian v. Poole, 282 F.3d 1204,1209 (9th Cir.
2002)(~Finding prejudice where perjured witness 'was the makeor-break witness for the state' .")(emphasis in original).
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Therefore, where both _the.prosecutor and the state's make-orbreak/star witness orchestrates [perjury]-and [subordinate per-

jury] in the presence of the state's [advisory witness]; as a
member of the prosecution 1 's team, both, the prosecutor and advisory witness are active participants in the unlawful and unconstitutional acts of "suppressing [material] evidence" in violation
of clearly established law(s) under the BRADY and KYLES standards.
Yet, the district court elected to not address this constitutional
controlling matter, which would more than fu~velmet the criteria of
[new claims].

Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419, 115 s.ct. 1555, 131

L.Ed.2d 490 (1995); Brady v. Maryland, 373 u.s. 83, 83 s.ct. 1194,
10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963).

Const. Amend. 14; Const. Art~ 1,§13.

The record(s) of all proceedings and filed pleadings to this
case would lawfully reflect that [n]o competent attorney which was
[appointed] to represent the defendant/appellant ever bothered
.J/

one time to rai$e- and of the BRADY -or- KYLES violation(s) in the
manner which the appellant (and two (2) jailhouse lawyers) has-d0ne
as a [prose] litigant uneducated in the skills and art of
litigation(s). Had either the prosecutor, the state's advisory
witness, or even defense counsel brought it to the attention(s) of
the court ~nd [jury] that the state's make-or-break/star witness
was indeed --_providing [false testimony] iri order to create prejudicial evidence against the defendant/appellant and lawfully
sought to [IMPEACH] the state's make-or-break/star witness, there
most certainly would have been a different outcome in the prosecution and conviction of the defendant/appellant, for there would
have been [no other] "evidence" but an [u]ntested alleged rape kit
sample which the defendant asked his defense counsel on several
ocassions to "test the rape kit" and was [assured] that feat [would
be done] •.. which [never was].

see Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139,
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139 P.3d 741

(Ct. App. 2006); State v~ Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396,

958 P.2d 22 (1998); Richter v. Hickman, 578 F.3d 944 (C.A. 9
2009). Const. Art. 1,§13; Const. mend. 14.
The appellant asserts that even before the trial began, both
the prosecutor and advisory witness, as well as, defense counsel
[had in their possession(s)], a clear and exact copy of all of
the Police Reports, Medical Reports, and Statements from Material
eyewitnesses, thus holding firsthand knowledge of the contents
within all Discovery material, yet, the record clearly supports
the allegation(s)/claim(s) that each.arid eveiyone of these representatives of the law -- sat

in

the courtroom as the state's make-

or-break/star witness provided [false testimony] in order to create
the [evidence] to convict ••• each and everyone of the representatives of the law -- ''kept their mouths [shut] as the show-wenton."
Thereby, creating the cumulative effects of BRADY, KYLES,
STRICKLANDi~~ •. NAPUE, GIGLIO, and BAGLEY violations of established
standards -- and the district court elected to DISMISS the action.
Furthermore, the prosecutor, advisory witness, and defense couns~l
also violated the IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT in their_
roles of [representatives] of clearly established [law(sl]. Const.
Art. 1§13; U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14.
Appellant asserts that the above Police Investigation(s),Reports,
Medical Reports, and Statements (from material eyewitnesses)
clearly· satisfy the first two requirements of Brady: they are
"favorable to the accused

because [they are] •.. impeaching,"

and theyclearly have been [suppressed] py both the State and
Defense Counsel,- either willfully or inadvertently.

11

Strickler v.

Greene, 527 u.s. 263,281-82, 119 s.ct. 1936, 144 L.Ed.2d 286
(1999)(Brady applies not only to information known to the prosecutor, but also to ''evidence 'known only to police [investigators]
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and not the prosecutor.'" Id. at 280-81

(quoting Kyles v. Whitley,

514 U.S. 419,438, 115 s.ct. 1555, 13J L.Ed.2d 490 (1995). With
respect to the [first Brady requirement], the above material
evidence are classic·examples to [impeachment] evidence. With
respect to the [second Brady Requirement], both the [prosecutor
and advisory witness] undoubtly [suppressed] the evidence from
the court and jury, as well as, the appellant. Under the Napue
standards, both the prosecutor and advisory witness owed not only
the court and jury, but also, the appellant to disclose any and
all evidence that exposes the state's make-or-break/star winess
is unlawfully providing [false testimony] and creating [false
evidence] and the record clearly supports the material factor(s)
that "at no time did any representative of the state disclose the
impeachment material to either the couit and jury -or- appellant.
during~Jany course ( s) of prosecution.

11

Defense counsel owed the appellant the duty bf [disclosure] on
all discovery material which is lawfully essential to the meaningful defense to allegations thrusted upon him by both the state
and its make-or-break/star witness, and defense counsel owes the
appellant the constitutional duty to [zealous representation]
under clearlj established law(s) and both federal and state constitutions.

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 s.ct.

2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984) see also IDAHO RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT.

U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1 ,§13.

Appellant respectfully asserts that the errors may not be pre~
judicial standing alone, therefore, this court must "consider
all of the Napue and Brady violations [collectively] and ask
whether 'there is a [reasonable probability] that ... the result
of the trial proceedings would have been different.

1 9.
/

Appellant respectfully asserts that though the' Brady standards
apply to the state's actions, surely, Strickland, the Idaho
Rules of Professional Conduct, and the American Bar Association
Stabdards (ABA) 4-4.1 must enstill a constitutional obligation
upon any defense counsel who acts as the state's [adversary].
see Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312,332n.13, 325, 102 S.Ct.
445, 70 L.Ed.2d 509 (198J); Jackson v. Brown, 513 F.3d 1057,1079
C.A. 9 2008); State v. Goodrich, 104 Idaho 469, 660 P.2d 934
(1983).
Appellant respectfully asserts ''It wai [error] for the district
court to [dismiss] the SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION and MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
where [numerous] factual and material allegations/claims clearly
exist in the case, including a question whether there was indeed
[false testimony] which would be discoverable had the district
court taken the effort to study and research the trial records
and evidence pertinent to appellant's prosecution." Goodrich, 104
Idaho at 472; Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148,157, 177 P.3d 362,
371

(2008).

(emphasis in originals).

U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,

1 4 ; Const. Art. 1 , § 1 3 .
Appellant further asserts that the prosecution and conviction
he was subjected to suffer was infested with [fundamental errors]
and the distri6t court surely make its determinations that such
violations were "harmless" and "failed to state a claim."
However, the standard for determining whether error of constitutional dimension is "harmless," as set forth in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, ,87 s.ct. 824, 17 L.Ed.2d 705 (1967), is
"that before a federal constitutional error can be held harmless,
the court must be able to declare a belief that it was tharmless]
-- beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 24, 87 s.ct. at 828.
Although the harmless error standard in Chapman is clearly appl~cable to claimed violations of the other constitutional rights,

20.

the harmless error standard in Chapman is clearly applicable to

the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of the assistance of counsel.
Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 98 s.ct. 1173, 55 L.Ed.2d
426 (1978); Milton v. Wainwright, 407 u.s. 371, 92 s.ct. 2174,
33 L.Ed.2d 1 (1972); State
1043 (1980).

v.

Sharp, 101 Idaho 498,507, 616 P.2d

u.s.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1,§13.

(emphasis in original).
Error that is fundamental must be such error as goes to the
foundation or basis of a defendant's rights or must go to the
foundation of the case or take from the defendant a right which
was essential to his defense and which no court could or ought to
permit him to waive and error which" so profoundly distorts the
trial that it produces [manifeat injustice] and [deprives] the
accused of his [constitutional right] to [due process;" State v.
Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267,281, 77 P.3d 956,970 )2003);State v. Kenner,
121 Idaho 594,597, 826 P.2d 1306,1309 (1992). An error is harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt if the Court can conclµde, based on the
evidence and argument presented during the trial, that the jury
would have reached the same result [absent] the error. State v.
Sandoval-Tena, 138 Idaho 908, 71 P.3d 1055 (2003); State v. Christiansen, 144 Idaho 463,470, 163 P.3d 1175,1182 (2007).
Appellant respectfully asserts that "it would border on the
absurd to say that the jury ignorea the [false testimony] in
arriving at the~~-decision had either the prosecutor, state's
advisory witness, or defense counsel confronted the state's
m~ke-or-break/star witness with the police reports, medical reports,
or even the contents in the material eyewitnesses statements that
did not corroborate the testimony given before the court and jury.
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Appellant asserts that ''If the district court would have taken
the effort to [compare] the statements contained within the POLICE
REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS, and STATEMENTS (material eyewitnesses),
the court would clearly have come to the conclusion(s) that
there was absolutely [nothing] the state's make-or-break/star
witness stated to POLICE INVESTIGATORS, MEDICAL PERSONNEL, or
what the [material eyewitnesses] stated to POLICE INVESTIGATORS
that corroborate what she was testifying to before the trial
court and jury. There are also inconsistent testimony throughout
the trial transcript(s) that completely contradicts the state's
make-or-break/star witness from time-to-time.
Case in point -- "How many different versions can on~ witness
provide to the jury just on 'how she exited the vehicle after'
arrival at the residence?" There was never any testimony -orevidence produced that reflected -- the victim left the vehicle,
then the victim was placed---back -- in to the vehicle in order
to be [removed] in so many different occurrences. Surely; an
individual can only exit a vehicle one (1) time, if not placed
[back in] the same vehicle.

Furthermore, the very same make-

or-break/star witness informed POLICE INVESTIGATORS that ''she
walked iri to the house~ then before the court and jury, there
are inconsistent versions on ''how she got in to the alleged
place of the assault(s).~
Apparently neither the trial judge, the jury, the prosecutor,
advi~ory witness, or defense counsel gave very much [attention]
to the testimony that was actually given by the state's makeor-break/star witness. Surely, the trial transcripts speak
volumes on false testimony to create evidence.

22.

False statement usually will be ''materialu for purposes of
supporting perjury charge if it is material to any proper point
of inquiry and is calculated and intended to [bolster testimony]
of the witness on some material point or to [support] or attack
his/her credibility, even though it does not bear directly on
ultimate issue of fact.

I.e. §18-5401.

123 Idaho 263, 846 P.2d 914.

State v. McBride, 1992,

P·erson making material statements

to officers [is] presumed to tell truth, and his/her denial of
making such statements may justify [perjury] conviction.
§18-5401.

IV.

I.C.

State v. Terry, 1931, 50 Idaho 283, 295 P. 427;

TROMBETTA VIOLATION(S).
The appellant asserts that throughout his [prose] MEMORANDUM

OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF and SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION, he (appellant) argued
allegations/claims on the "state's [destruction] of physical
evidence" while under [notice to preserve] said evidence for the
"defendant was 'expected to exhaust his post-conviction remedies'
after the adjudication on his direct appeal."

(see MEMORANDUM

OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.48-65)(see also
attached exhibits G.,H., and J.).
Appellant respectfully asserts that nothinq but [competent
evidence] is to be submitted to the [iury] under clearly established law and the constitution. Irwin, 9 Idaho 35,44. Thereby,
the [only] controlling matter that made the [rape kit] competent
evidence was, the mouth of the state's make-or-break/star witness and the contorlling material fact that neither the state
nor defense counsel eve~ bothered to submit the stntP's alleoed
evidence to the statA's crime laborato~v for

23.

RDV

tvpA(s) of

;

Forensic tPstinrr(s). HowPver. the state ana defense counsel iust
tonk the word of a clear fiuntruthfull self-nroclai~ed victim and
the doctor who oroclaimed that "He saw one (1) sinale soerm in thA
sample taken from the alleged victim while at the hospital."
The above factors do not make the alleged [rape kit sample/
sperm] ... competent evidence.

There never was any competent

evidence presented at the trial that the sperm sample indeed came
from the defendant/appellant.
Factually, defense counsel (Brad Chapman) knew full well that
his client outright "denied" having sexual intercourse with the
proclaimed victim and khew full well for months that there was
indeed a man in the community who was willing to be investigated,
provide a deposition/statement that "He, was in fact a sexual
partner to the (alleged) victim" and defense counsel did absolutely
nothing about this material and vital information.
Defense counsel knew full well exactly what the al~eged victim
was going to be testifying to during trial proceedings and knew
that the alleged victim was going to testify that "[S]he has not
has 'sexual intercourse' for two (2) years" thereby, forcing
the assumption that the defendant/appellant [must be the source
of the sperm sample].
Thereby, making the alleged [sperm sample/rape kit] a most
vital and controlling piece of physical evidence. The importance
of the physical evidence was established not only because the
self-acclaimed victim was claiming that she was [raped], but,
both the state and alleged victim were claiming that ''The victim
was 'slipped a date rape drug in her drink(s) while at the bar
and the defendant/appellant was the source of such conduct'~"
Making the physical evidence a controlling piece of material
evidence and neither the state -or- defense counsel bother to
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subject the alleged evidence to a Serology test, but also, a
Toxicology test as well for determination(s) On if ~n fact the
alleged victim "was slipped a 'date-rape-drug' causing such intoxication" as being proclaimed by the state with absolutely no
evidence to support their theory.
The record supports the material fact(s) that the state claimed
a "date-rape-drug" and argued such factor to the jury. Therefore,
the physical evidence was indeed [material] to the defendant/
appellant. Furthermore "It is the [duty] of the prosecutor to see
that a defendant has a fair trial. The desire for success should
never induce him/her to obtain a verdict by argument based on anything except the [evidence] in the case and the conclusions legitimately [deducible] from the law applicable to the same·." State
v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394,408, 253 P.2d 203,211

(1953); State v.

Griffiths, 101 Idaho 163,168, 610 P.2d 522527 (1980).

(emphasis

in original). Const. Art. 1,§13; U.S.C.A. Const. Amend. 14.
Appellant asserts that "If defense counsel would have [paid
attention] to both the [evidence] from the discovery material and
the [testimony] during trial proceedings, counsel would have adduced the following constitutional factors:"
1.J

The state's make-or-break/star witness testified that

"She only [had} two (2) Bloody Marys the [entire] evening."
(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p.19
( 2. ) •

2.)

The state's make-or-break/star witness testified that

"She drank [both] drinks while [sitting] at the bar."

(see

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.32(n3,
(19.)), 33(,T2), 39(,T2,27.), 115-116, 119(,T5,I.), 120(1.-3.)). ·
3.) The prosecutor was arguing/alleging that a "date-rape-drug
was [slipped] iri to the alleged victim's [drink] by the defendant/
appellant."

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION
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RELIEF,pp.38(nn1&c26.>-n3), 39(nn1-(27.)), 41 <nn2-3&(31.), 42
(n~1-2), 82(n2-(A.)), 91(questions&answers), 92(n3), 112(nn2-3),
115-117, 119(1.)-120(3.)).

(empasis in pleading).

and most importantly
4.)

The alleged victim personally informed police investiga-

tors that "[A]fter, becoming [i]ntoxicated
the defendant/appellant."

she was talking to

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.22TI3, 38(26.), 41(~5), 42 (nn1&3), 46
(n4), 77(A.), 91-92, 112; 143(h.), and 191(d.)[specifically 128

(~n1-3].

Thereby, appellant respectfully asserts that "had either

the court or the jury 'paid attention' to the testimony, they
would have been able to sufficiently adduce the material and exculpatory facts that the state's make-or-break/star witness .w.as __
not only 'intoxicated before the defendant/appellant came into the
equation of events;' but al~o admitted that 'she only had two
(2) drinks and had drank those drinks at the [bar] while sitting
next to another individual' therefore the allegations the prosecutor was thrusting upon the defendant/appellant regarding a
Tdate-rape-drugT being slipped in to the alleged victim's drink
was -.- improbable."
The appella~t asserts that ''in his (prose) MOTION FOR RECONSI~
DERATION which was filed before the district court [before] his
case was DISMISSED, the arguement was made on how [pr~vious
Postconviction counsel (Walsh) simply moved the court to WITHDRAW [his] MOTION ON TESTING STATE'S EVIDENCE/rape kit after
counsel discovered that the STATE had DESTROYED the requested
evidence -- counsel simply moved the cou~t to WITHDRAW said
motion and permit the court to enter a SUMMARY DISMISSAL on
appellant's postconviction application -- instead of petitioning

the court for a CONTINUANCE and argue the unconstitutional acts

26.

RELIEF,pp.38(f[f[1&(26. )-f[3), 39(f[f[1-(27.)), 41 (f[f[2-3&(31.), 42
(f[f[1-2), 82(f[2-(A.)), 91(questions&answers), 92(f[3), 112(f[f[2-3),
115-117, 119(1.)-120(3.)).

(empasis in pleading).

and most importantly •••
4.)

The alleged victim personally informed police investiga-

tors that "[A]fter, becoming [i]ntoxicated
the defendant/appellant."

she was talking to

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.22n3, 38(26.), 41(~5), 42 (f[f[1&3), 46
(f[4), 77(A.), 91-92, 112, 143(h.), and 191(d.)[specifically 128
(f[f[1-3].

Thereby, appellant respectfully asserts that "had either

the court or the jury 'paid attention' to the testimony, they
would have been able to sufficiently adduce the material and exculpatory facts that the state's make-or-break/ star witness .w.as ...
not only 'intoxicated before the defendant/appellant came into the
equation of events}' but also admitted that 'she only had two
(2) drinks and had drank those drinks at the [bar] while sitting
next to another individual' therefore the allegations the prosecutor was thrusting upon the defendant/appellant regarding a
Tdate-rape-drugT being slipped in to the alleged victim's drink
was -.- improbable.
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The appellant asserts that "in his (prose) MOTION FOR RECONSI-:
DERATION which was filed before the district court [before] his
case was DISMISSED, the arguement was made on how [previous
Postconviction counsel (W~lsh) simply moved the court to WITHDRAW [his] MOTION ON TESTING STATE'S EVIDENCE/rape kit after
counsel discovered that the STATE ·had DESTROYED the requested
evidence -- counsel simply moved the court to WITHDRAW said
motion and permit the court to enter a SUMMARY DISMISSAL on
appellant's postconviction application -- instead of petitioning
the court for a CONTINUANCE and argue the unconstitutional acts

26.

of the DESTRUCTION of physical evidence by the state under
clearly established law of California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 488,
486,488-89, 104 s.ct. 2528,2533-34, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984)(see
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,p.16(~~2-3).

(emphasis in original

pleading).
As asserted before the district court·~· On March 27,2006,
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney [Rick Baughman] forwarded his
MEMORANDUM to the Evidence Custodian (Denise Rosen) requesting
that "The evidence be retained (specifically the [rape kit])
as we feel this defendant will appeal and will request PostConviction Relief. Please retain for [ at least] one ( 1) year."
(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p.
50(~3)).
On January 17,2008, the Idaho Court 6f Appeals issued it's
REMITTITUR which therefore mandated that the appellant proceed
to his Post-Convictin remedies.

Thereby, the defendant/appellant

lawfully held one (1) year to completely exhaust his Postconviction remedies.
Yet., the state took the position without notifying the defendant/
appellant and DESTROYED the only evidenc~ which possibly could
. have been used to present a complete defense against the false
allegation that "He had sexual intercourse with the proclaimed
victim" and such conduct was "non-consentual" and therefore
constitued [rape] under Idaho Criminal Laws.
On March 27,2088, the Evidence Custodian-Louise Martin of the
Couer d' Alene Police Department and Prosecutor-Denise Rosen •..
took it upon themselves to DESTROY the rape kit that was being
held under their control.

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

POST-CONVICrION RELIEF,p.54).

27.

Appellant made a lawful and clear argument to the district court
on the violation(s) of his constitutional rights and apparently
the district court chose to disregard any of the argument(s) and
the appellant's constitutional rights.

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN

SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.48-65)(empasis in original
pleading).
- The obligation to investigate only grows more imperative where
the [evidence] at issue is the ]only forensic evidence] that could
reasonabley support the defense theory.

Duncan v. Ornoski, 528

F.3d 1222,1236 (9th Cir. 2008). The central role that the potentially exculpatory forensic evidence could have played in the
defendant's/appellant's defense increased counsel's [duty] to not oaly
seek the assistance of an expert before trial proceedings, but,
also to seek justice in a case such as this where the state takes
it upon themselves to destroy the only forensic evidence that
could possibly be used to present a complete defense. Id. at 528
F.3d 1236; Trombetta, 467 U.S., at 486-487 ("Moreover, fashioning
remedies for the illegal destruction of evidence can pose troubling
choices. In nondisclosure cases, a court can [grant] the defendant
a [new trial] at which the previously suppressed evidence may be
introduced. But, when evidence [has been destroyed] in violation
of the Constitution, the [court] [must] choose between [barring
further prosecution] or suppressing the state's most probative
evidence."). Id. at 486-487.

(emphasis in original).

However, the record stands perfectly clear that at the hearing
for the SUMMARY DISMISSAL ... previous appointed counsel for the
Postconviction Application simply moved the Court to "WITHDRAW"
the "MOTION FOR TESTING STATE'S EVIDENCE" rather than defend the
defendant/appellant's constitutional rights under clearly estab~
lished Supreme Court law.
(see MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,p.16
(~~2-3). Const. Art. 1,§13; U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14.
28.

Appellant respectfully asserts that "It was never a 'tactical
decision' for any of the appointed attorneys to 'pass-the-buck'
when it came to either 'testing' the state's alleged evidence
contained within the professed 'rape kit' and it cannot be held
that counsel made an 'informed tactical decision' at the hearing
for SUMMARY JUDGMENT on appellant's Postconviction Application
and elected to simply WITHDRAW and 'let-it-rest' when the evidence
was so constitutionally 'lacking' in a court of law." Strickland,
466 U.S., at 668; Crane v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 683,691, 106 s.ct.
2142,2146, 90 L.Ed.2d 636 (1986)("Whether rooted directly in the
Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, or in the Confrontation clauses of the Sixth Amendment, the Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant

a meaningful opportunity to present a

complete defense. 11 ) . U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14; Const. Art. 1,
§13.
Appellant further asserts that "another reason that made the
testing(s) of the State's physical evidence more imperative for
defense counsel was 11
(a) During trial arguments, the court instructed defense counsel (Chapman) " .•• because the [testimony] of the alleged victim
will be that there's a [reason] for the sperm being there, and the
doctor's testimony about the existence of sperm physically is
[corroborative], ••. " (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POSTCONVICTION RELIEF, p.74(~5.).
(b) During trial testimony the alleged victim sat before the
[jury] and stated the [first] time'' ••• she, did not know how long
the suspect had his penis inside her vagina and vaginally raped
her

because, she was [knocked out]." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN

SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p.105(~3) and (TT),p.329,Ls.8-13).
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However, her [testimony] before the [jury] is factually quite
inconsistent again -- for she clearly and specifically told
Investigator T. Martin (Advisory Witness) during Police Investigation(s) -- "The male raped her [vaginally] for approximately
ten (10) - to - fifteen (15) minutes." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.105(ff4), 169(5.), 172
(ff2Ls.20-22), 175, 177, 190, 191(i.), 200(ff3).

(emphasis in ori-

ginals).
Secondly, during the initial Police Investigation(s), the
alleged victim informed Detective T. Martin (Advisory Witness)
that:
"[S]he was [not] wearing a [bra] -- or -- panites." (see
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, p.177
(ff2).

Then -- as the very same alleged victim [testified] before the
[jury]

"[S]he [was] wearing a bra and underwear." (see MEMORAN-

DUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p.177 [questions

& answers] see also p.178[questions & answers]).
Defense counsel (Brad Chapman) knew full well what the state's
make-or-break/star witness was going to be testifying to and had
defense counsel actually [read] and [followed] the Police Investigation Report (T. Martin) and [compared] the [contents] of the
material/relevant evidence -- to the planned testimony -- there
was an abundance of inconsistencies that would drive any competent
attorney to [fully investigate] all evidence that would lead to
the disclosure of the [truth], as well as,

[expose] any planned

[false testimony].
Any competent attorney could aduce this evidence.

30.

Appellant asserts that "had the state's (advisory witness]

confronted both -- the prosecutor and the state's make-or-break/
star witness with the actual contents contained throughout the
investigation report (which [he] authored), the witness would
surely have been exposed before the jury as an individual who
was more than willing to commit [perjury] while under [oath] and
the prosecutor would have also been exposed before the jury -as a representative of the 'law' who was more than willing to
commit [subordinate perjury] in order to secure a conviction with
actual [fales testimony/evidence] time-after-time."

State v.

Terry, 1931, 50 Idaho 283, 295 P. 427 ("In perjury prosecution,
testimony that (witness) made -- to (law enforcement officers),
yet denied making to officers held admissible to corroborate the
officers (advisory witness) challenges of truth.").

(see also

MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,p.177
(~4) -- which version is the [lie] and -- which version(s) is
the [truth] . ") •
Appellant further asserts that "The state made a great issue(s)
out of the [intoxication] of their alleged victim, as well as,
had repeated [testimony] from their witness on how t[s]he floatedin-and-out' of [consciousness] while [inside the vehicle] in
route to the [residence]." (the record supports this fact).
The state's witness testified before the jury on how "[S]he
did [not remember] getting into the car in order to depart the
bar, however, [s]he [reained•consciousness] from time-to-time
[inside the vehicle], and testified to [n]umerous [i]nconsistent
versions on how '[s]he [exited the vehicle] upon arrival'."
However, neither the [prosecutor], the state's [advisory witness],
[defense counsel], the [court], nor the [jury] apparently paid
attention to the testimony from material eyewitness [Tamarack Y.
McDonald].

31 •

During testimony, this material eyewitness testified to the
relevant fact(s) that "even though the alleged victim appeared to
be intoxicated, she (victim) was more than capable to conversate,
left the bar under her (victim's) own free will, personally [h]anded
the car keys to the defendant/appellant, and from the 'time that
[both] the alleged victim and the defendant/appellant 'entered in
to the vehicle' and left the 'parking lot' of the bar -- [nothing]
seemed to be 'wrong' with the alleged 'victim'."

(see MEORANDUM

OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.125(c.)-135(emphasis
on 125(c.),132(e.)-(f.),133(2.),134(~~(3-4)),135(5.-questions&
answers)).
Oddly, where there is [eyewitness] that can [dispute] the
various versions the state's witness and prosecutor present to the
[jury], there is no corroboration whatsoever as testimony is offered to create evidence for the state.
The alleged victim creates a version on how "[S]he was not conscious [until]

'waking inside the vehicle, being driven by an

unknown individual -- then repeatedly

'floating in-and-out' of

her cognative state(s) while in route to the unknown location'.''
The evidence creates quite an incredible scenario of events
from the time of [d]eparture from the material eyewitness, to the
moment of [a]rrival to the residence. Then, after [arrival] -[consciousness] is [lost repeatedly] -- up until the law enforcement officers begin to respond to the location and question the
alleged victim.
However, there [never] was any [testimony] on how "[e]ither
law enforcement -or- medical personnel [provided] any type(s)
of known [medication(s)] that caused the alleged victim to be able
to provide detailed information, let alone [regain complete con-

sciousness and provide statements to either -- motel staff, law
32.

enforcement, or medical staff." Thus, such evidence would clearly
draw the attention of competent individuals [inside] the courtroom
that indeed -- the [evidence] did not support the version(s)
presented by either the [prosecutor] nor the state's [witness].
Thereby, this alleged evidence is not -- competent evidence, or
draws the conclusion(s) of [proof beyond a reasonable doubt].
I.C.R. Rule 42(j)(2). see also I.R.E. Rule 303(b)(" ••. could find
guilt on the [presumed fact] -- beyond a reasonable doubt."). see
also MEMORADUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.33
(ff4)-34(ff1),156(ffff2)-157.

(emphasis in original).

The Supreme Court has held "It necessarily follows that if the
[omitted] evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise exist, constitutional error has been committed. This means
that the omission must be evaluated in the context of the entire
record. If there is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not
the additional evince is considered, there is no justification for
a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already questionable, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might
be sufficient to create a reasonable doubt."

u.s-;- v~-Agurs, 427

U.S. 97,112-113, 96 s.ct. 2392,2402, 49 L.Ed.2d 342 (1976).
Appellant asserts that "Where the state made the effort to con.:;.
tact the [Evidence custodian] and put the state's agency on
[notice] to [preserve the rape kit] ••• " therefore such action
makes the physical e:vidence "material" and the state agencies
knew that the de~endant/appellant was -- expected to proceed to
his Postconviction Remedies [before] the destruction of the only
evidence possible for the constitutional right to both challenge
the evidence -- and present a complete defense.
Therefore, for all of the cumulative effects against the appel-
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lants defense, the actions of the both the state and defense
counsel created the unconstitutional "fundamental error(s)"
that clearly prevented the defendant/appellant from obtaining a
[Fair Trial] in the courts of Idaho.

Const. ~rt. 1,§§2&13;

U.S.C.A. Const. Amends. 6,14.
Had defense counsel simply (a) tested the alleged rape kit,
and (b) presented the testimony of the potential inculpatory
witness who was willing to testify before the court and jury that
[he was] a [sexual partner] to the state's make-or-break/star
witness who sat before both the court and jury testifying that
"[S]he has not had sex for two (2) years" -- there most certainly
would have been a different outcome of the trial proceedings and
eventual conviction of one proclaiming that "[H]e did not -- have
sexual intercourse with the self-professed victim."
Appellant asserts that "once the state presented testimony from
its make-or-break/star witness alleging that [she] has 'not had
sex' for two (2) years" -- the State "Opened-The-Door" for the
appellant to present both [his] material/fact witness to dispute
this testimony and defense counsel was ineffective assistance of
counsel for not providing the necessary adversarial testing to
this false testimony and false evidence created before the jury.
Furthermore, the State acted in "Bad Faith" when it took it
upon itself to "destroy the evidence" long before the defendant/
appellant was ever issued his Remittitur and began the lawful
process of Postconviction Relief in the appropriate courts of
Idaho. Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534, 716 P.2d 1306 (1986);
State v. Bruno, 119 Idaho 199, 804 P.2d 928 (Ct. App. 1990).
Const. Art. 1,§§2&13; U.S.C.A. Const. ~mend. 14.

34.

When evidence has been lost or destroyed, courts engage in 11 a
case-by-case assessment of the government's culpability for the
loss, together with a realistic appraisal of its signicance when
viewed in the light of its nature, its bearing upon critical
issues in the case and strength of the government's [u]ntainted
[p]roof."

United States v. Heiden, 508 F.2d 898.902 (9th Cir.

1974); Paradis v. State, 110 Idaho 534,541, 716 P.2d 1306,1313
(1986). Evidence that has not been preserved by the prosecution,
but which can be indirectly determined by [other] means, will be
deemed material in a constitutional sense "if, viewed in relation to [all] [c]ompetent [e]vidence admitted at trial, it appears
to raise a reasonable doubt concerning the defendant's [guilt]."
State v. Leatherwood, 104 Idaho 100,105, 656 P.2d 760,765 (Ct.
App. 1 982) •
The record clearly reflects the material fact(s) that "the state
never presented any [u]ntatinted [p]roof during the trial proceedings and the state's alleged Arape-kit' sample was the only
evidence which the defendant/appellant could have [e]ver used to
challenge the untruthfulness of both the state's make-or-break/
star witness and the prosecutor."
Therefore, the district court failed miserably to even consider
this vital material fact befor~ DISMISSING the defendant/appeallant's SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION and the
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF w/attached
exhibits.

V.

Const. Art. 1,§§2&13; u.s.c.A. Const. Amends. 6,14. Id.

STRICKLAND VIOLATION(S).
The appellant asserts that throughout his [prose] MEMORANDUM

35.

OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF and SECOND OR\ SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION, he (appellant) argued allegations/
claims on the INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, and PREJUDICE which appellant was
subjected to by -- not only trial counsel, but appointed counsel
on Direct Appeal and the [numerous] appointed counsel(s) on the
Postconviction Applications.

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF

POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.1-225; see also SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE
POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION,pp.2(4.)-25; and MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION,pp.7-31).
Appellant asserts pursuant to Idaho Code §19-852(b)(3) A needy
person who is entitled to be represented by an attorney under
subsection (a) is entitled:

•.••.• (3) to be represented in any

other post-conviction or post-commitment proceeding that the
attorney or the needy person considers appropriate, unless the
court in which the proceeding is brought determines that it is
not a proceeding that a reasonable person with adequate means
would be willing to bring at his own expense and is therefore a
[frivolous] proceeding.
When considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the trial
court [must] do more than determine whether the petition-alleges
a [valid] claim. The court must also consider whether -- circumstances pervent the petitioner from making a [more thorough]
investigation into the [facts]. An [indigent defendant] who is
[incarcerated in the penitentiary] would almost [certainly] be
[unable] to [conduct an investigation into facts not already
contained in the court record]. Likewise, a [prose] petitioner
may be unable to present sufficient facts showing that his or
her counsel's performance was [deficient] or that such deficiency
[prejudiced] the defense. That showing [will often] require the
[assistance of someone trained in the law]. Therefore, the trial
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court should appoint counsel if the petition [alleges facts]
showing the -- [possibility] of a valid [claim] such that areasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
counsel to [conduct further investigation] into the claim. The
investigation by counsel may not produce evidence sufficient to
survive a motion to dismiss. But, the decision to appoint counsel
and the decision on the [merits] of the petition if counsel is
appointed are controlled by two different standards • Swader v.
State, 143 Idaho 651,654-55, 152 P.3d 12, 15-16 (2007).
Thus, in determining whether [appellant] raised the "possibility
of a valid claim,'' the court(s) consider whether the appointment
of counsel [would have assisted] him in conducting an investigation
into facts not in the record.
If the appellant did not raise the [possibility of a valid
claim], the district court's error did not effect his substantial
rights.
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 61 counsels: "The court at
every stage of the proceeding [must disregard] any error or defect
in the proceeding which does not affect the [substantial rights]
of the parties."
The appellant respectfully asserts that "He, raised sufficient
claims before the district court where the [reord] amply supports
that appellant was indeed 'convicted on [false testimony/evidence]'
which more than sufficiently been discoverable not just through
the court record(s), but also, by [comparing the POLICE REPORTS,
the MEDICAL REPORTS, and the ST.A.TEMENTS (by material/fact eyewitnesses)] to the true contents of statements made by pertinent
witnesses, and those very statements made by the state's make-orbreak/star witness which does [not] coincide to the testimony
and creation of evidence throughout the criminal trial proceedings."
Respectfully "How many [lies] does it take to IMPEACH?

37.

11

Appellant presented before the district court ample allegations/
claims of the INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, ATTORNEY MISCONDUCT, CONFLICT OF INTEREST, and PREJUDICE which he (appellant)
suffered from appointed counsel throughout [every stage of litigation] which requires [competent assistance] of an attorney
acting as his [diligent conscientious [a]dvocate]. State v. Tucker,
97 Idaho 4,8, 539 P.2d 556,560 (1975); State v. McCabe, 101 Idaho
727,728, 620 P.2d 300,301

(1980); State v. Huck, 124 Idaho 155,

157-58, 857 P.2d 634,636-37 (Ct. App. 1993).
Appellant asserts that absolutely none of the appointed attorneys
representing his cause ever raised the allegations/claims of which
he (appellant) has tried on numerous ocassions to address the courts
on and reach a meaningful adjudication on the mertis of the cumulative fundamental errors.
A good- example of this is, the appellant presented the district
court with a indication of "material and factual eyewitnesses"
which defense counsel (Brad Chapman) totally failed to interv~ew
and gather additional vital information to subject the state's case
to a [meaningful adversarial testing] regardless of clearly established law(s) under not only the Strickland standard, but also
under the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct.

see Lord v. Wood,

184 F.3d 1083, 1095-96 (9th Cir. 1995)("holding that counsel's
failure to call [key witnesses] whose [testimony] undermined the
prosecutor's case [c]onstituted [deficient performance].");
Rio~·v; Rocha, ~299 F:3d 796,805 (9th-Ci~~ 2002)("The·f~il~i~ to~·
investigate is especially egregious when a defense attorney fails
to consider [potentially exculpatory evidence]."; Harris v. Wood,
64 F.3d 1432,1435-37 (9th Cir. 1995)("Holding that 'counsel's'
failure to retain an investigator and [i]nterview many of the
[individuals indentified in the 'police reports') was [d)eficient

performance.") .

( emphasis in originals) •
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The decision to [impeach] a witness is a tactical decision.

State v. McKenney, 101 Idaho 149,152, 609 P.2d 1140,1143 (1980);
see also State v. Fee, 124 Idaho 170,174, 857 P.2d 649,653 (Ct.
App. 1993). Likewise, the decision of what [evidence] should be
introduced at trial is also tactical. Bagshaw v. State, 142 Idaho
34,38, 121 P.3d 965,969 (Ct. App. 2005).
Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's
[evidence] has raised [no genuine issue of material fact] that,
if resolved in the applicant's favor, would [entitle] the applicant
to the requested relief. A "material fact" has some [logical connection] with the [consequential facts], Black's Law Dictionary,
991

(7th Ed. 1999), and therefore is determined by the relationship

to the legal theories presented by the parties. If such a [factual
issue is presented], an evidentiary hearing [m]ust be (c]onducted.
Gonzales v. State, 120 Idaho 759,763, 819 P.2d 1159,1163 (Ct. App.
1 991).
The district court concluded that appellant's application held
meree [conclusory allegations], unsupported by [admissible evidence], or the appellant's conclusions of law. Roman v. State, 125
Idaho 644,647, 873 P.2d 898,901

(Ct. App. 1994).

Appellant asserts, as to [conclusory] allegations. The district
court clearly concluded that [no supporting evidence] was offered.
As to [unsupported by admissible evidence], the appellant
asserts that -- the POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS, STATEMENTS
(by material eyewitnesses to police), and all of the attached
exhibits to the MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION
RELIEF are "all" supporting evidence and lawfully are material
evidence which any court would permit entry to the record during
trial proceedings before the [jury] for deterrnination(s) of the
[facts] before them.
39.

Appellant respectfully asserts that "if the district court would
have taken the effort to [c]ompare both the SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE
POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION and MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF w/attached supporting exhibits ••• there
would indeed have been both [supporting] and [admissible] evidence
to the lawful conclusion(s) that the appellant indeed -- did
raise a genuine issue of material fact with evidence that would
support the allegation/claim(s) that appellant was [c]onvicted
with false testimony/evidence in violation of his constitutional
rights."
Had the district court [c]ompared the POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL
REPORTS, and STATEMENTS (from material eyewitnesses) to the true
testimony and evidence presented to the jury -- there would have
sufficient conclusion(s) drawn that the state's make-or-break/star
witness was so inconsistent with her testimony, as well as, the
relevant fact that "there never was any material eyewitnesses to
coroborate the allegations" yet, there were indeed an abundance
of material eyewitnesses that lawfully [disputed] the testimony/
evidence the state's make-or-break/star witness and the prosecutor
orchestrated before the court and jury.
The variety of POLICE REPORTS are inconsistent to trial testimony,
the MEDICAL REPORTS never indicate any corroboration of a woman
who was violently physically and sexually assaulted, and the
STATEMENTS further disputed all of the testimony the alleged victim provided before the court and jury.
Case in point -- how many different versions can one alleged
victim create regarding the [exit] of the vehicle upon arrival?
How many different versions can one alleged victim create regarding the physical and sexual assault(s)? How many different
versions can one alleged victim create to a [rape] scenario?
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One moment the state's make-or-break/star witness testifies
before the jury that "She had only two (2) drinks" then both the
witness and prosecutor create a scenario on how the alleged victim "took a drink to the [t]able" after testimony of how "she
drank both drinks [at the bar] while sitting with another individaul."

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION

RELIEF,pp.116-121 ).

(emphasis in Trial Transcript/Preliminary

Hearing Transcript). see also MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POSTCONVICTION RELIEF,pp.122; 164-167; 171-179).
Furthermore, the MEDICAL REPORTS indicate "a slight abrasion on
the face." Yet, during trial, the state's make-or-break/star witness clearly explains a relevant fact ••• "one moment she falls
on what felt like a garbage -- a garbage bag 'full of cans' •.•
then changes testimony to 'not remembering stumbling, tripping,
or falling on [anything] that evening'." (see MEMORANDUM OF LAW
IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.193-194).

Oddly, none

of the MEDICAL REPORTS corroborate any allegation(s) of the alleged
victim "complaining of being repeatedly 'knocked-out' three (3)
times.~·
To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, an
applicant must satisfy a two-part test. The applicant must prove,
first, that the attorney's performance was [deficient] and second,
that the applicant was [prejudiced] by the deficiency. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 687; Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 313,316, 900 P.2d 22q,
224 (Ct. App. 1995).

DEFICIENT PERFORMANCE:
The appellant asserts that any competent attorney would have
provided reasonable professional assistance. However, the record,
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the SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION, and the
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF all provided the district court with an abundance of allegations/
claims that clearly reflect that absolutely no appointed attorney
provided assistance coming close to ~reasonable profession~l
assistanceu during the course(s) of both litigation and representation.
A strong point in case is -- any competent attorney would have
at least gone out and conducted an investigation on the material:
fact eyewitnesses who were unamed throughout the cumulative Police
Investigation(s) Reports and provided most vital testimony before
the jury in the defense of his needy client."

Everybit of the

information was relevant evidence which the record exhibits was
never pres~nted to the court(s) or jury.
Appellant asserts that "not only did all of his appointed attorneys fail to satisfy the requirements of the Strickland standard,
every attorney falied to satisfy the American Bar Association
Standards 4-4.1 and the Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct as
well."

(see MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,

pp.204-211).

The record supports the material/relevant fact(s)

that "none of these material eyewitnesses were ever -- investigated
or presented before the court(s) and jury and defense counsel
(Chapman) holds no justification(s) for such incompetent actions.
Lord v. Wootj, 184 F.3d 1083,1095-96 (9th Cir. 1995); Rios v. Rocha,
299 F.3d 796,805 (9th Cir. 2002); Harris v. wood, 64 F.3d 1432,
1435-37 (9th Cir. 1995) et al.
Defense attorneys do not have a duty to interview all potential
witnesses. State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415,424, 776 P.2d 424,433
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(1989); State v. Dye, 124 Idaho 250,258, 858 P.2d 789,797 (Ct.

App. 1993). However, under some circumstances such a failure can
constitute a deficiency in representation. Each case must be judged
according to the significance of the evidence the witness has to
offer and what other sources are available to ascertain the testimony of the witness. In view of the potential importance of
information ~eld by all of the named material/relevant eyewitnesses
which lawfully would have disproved numerous components of the
State's case and testimony against the appellant, this court must
be able to conclude that "it was patently unreasonable for appellant's attorneys not to pursue the vital and controlling matters
with each material eyewitness."
For the only alleged evidence the State held to take the appellant to trial and secure the conviction was -- an untruthful makeor-break/star witness and an alleged [rape kit] sample that was
alleged by the state's make-or-break/star witness to contain the
[sperm sam?le] from the defendant/appellant without any Scientific
testing(s) whatsoever for the State to meet its burden of proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt" on each element of contempt.

I.C.R.-

Rule 42(j) (2).
PREJUDICE:
Regardless of [all] of the "hidden material/relevant evidence"
which was never [entered] in to evidence, or,

[p]resented before

the court(s) and [jury] for the duty of finding guilt based on
[all of the evidence] beyond a reasonable doubt, every appointed

attorney from the trial -to- direct appeal -to- postconviction
proceedings the defendant/appellant was forced to endure the
prejudicial conduct from his attorneys.
The conduct of all -- appointed attorneys -- cannot lawfully be
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determined to be that of ''informed tactical decision(s) pursuant
to clearly established Supreme Court or Idaho Supreme Court law(s).''
The other sources that were available to ascertain the testimony
of the sate's make-or-break/star witness and the presentation(s)
of the state's case was indeed

- "suppressed" by not only the

prosecutor, but, by the state's advisory witness (Detective T.
Martin) and defense counsel (Brad Chapman), as well as, direct
appeal counsel and all postconviction relief attorneys.
Therefore, the material/relevant -- suppressed evidence justifies a "Conspiracy" to violate the defendant/appellant's constitutional rights. "The right to offer the [testimony of witnesses]
.•.• is in plain terms the right to present a defense, the right
to present the defendant's version of the facts •..• [The accused]
has the right to present his won witnesses to establish a defense.
This right is a fundamental element of [due process] of law.

11

Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14,19, 87 s.ct. 1920, 18 L.Ed.2d 1019
(1967). When the evidence is excluded on the basis of an unconstituional act(s) of either the state -or- appointed counsel, due
process concerns are still greater because the exclusion is unsupported by any legitimate judicial justification(s). Unite States
v, Lopez-Alvarez, 970 F.2d 583,588 (9th Cir. 1992).
Defense counsel's (Brad Chapman) creation of a defense to the
[rape charge] was that -- "The alleged victim -- screamed 'rape'
solely because she (alleged victim) felt the defendant/appellant
stole her vehicle."
There is and was absolutely no evidence contained throughout the
POLICE REPORTS, MEDICAL REPORTS, STATEMENTS {1 from material eyewitnesses)that would logically support such an incompetent and
idiotic defense when so much material/relevant evidence laid hidden away by the state and defense counsel (Brad Chapman).
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Factually, there is indeed a "material eyewitness" who could
lawfully "dispute" the theory created by defense counsel, yet,
defense counsel elected to "ignore the [e]vidence and create a
bogus theory contrary to any evidence throughout the case. (see
MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF POST-CONVICTION RELIEF,pp.206(1"[
f.)-207(f[~1-2; see also pp.208(1"[5.)-210(1"[1)). The record fully
supports the material and probative fact(s) that neither one of
these vital material witnesses were ever "interviewed", let alone
testified before the court(s) or [jury].

Thereby, the defendant/

appellant was indeed "prejudiced" by such failure(s) from defense
counsel (Brad Chapman) and the pathetic defense theory that was
concocted.
Defendant/Appellant never once "waived" any type(s) of his
constitutional rights or lawful defenses at any time(s) during any
of the representations from appointed counsel whether during all
the criminal proceedings, the direct appeal proceedings, or all
-- of the postconviction relief proceedings. Every appointed attorney took it upon themselves to select the defenses - to - all of
the issues to be selectively raised during direct appeal and all
of the postconviction relief proceedings. There never was any form
of "communication between attorney and client" as the record will
clearly reflect.
In reality, there is little or no way for the defendant/appellant to know whether he has been adequately represented during any
proceeding(s). Only when [a]nother [trained lawyer] reviews the
record and the entire proceedings can it be determined if there
are valid [claims] based on the ineffective assistance of counsel.
Sadly, it took the appellant and two (2) jailhouse lawyers to
sit of sift through the record and discover the unconstitutional
acts of "all appointed counsel" and the material fact(s) that the
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hauled into a courtroom, tried, convicted, and sentenced to the
state penitentiry -- behind nothing but "false testimony" and
"false evidence" all while the representatives of the law hid the
evidence that was lawfully both -- inculpatory to the state's makeor-break/star witness -- and exculpatory for the defendant/appellant. The record supports this claim made before this Honorable
Court.
The defects in the defendant/appellant's trial were the direct
result(s) of the [prosecutor's] pretrial constitutional failure(s)
to guard against improbity in the trial process, a failure which
rendered the trial itself patently [unfair] in due process terms.
The prosecutor saw fit without prophylaxis to call to the stand
its make-or-break/star witness whom was more than willing to lie
under oath and follow the orchestration of the prosecutor in order
to secure the conviction. The manner in which the trial unfolded
leaves the definite conviction that the process itself lacked
fundamental fairness and delivered a palpably unreliable result.
Appellant asserts that "Neither the State, nor any appointed
Counsel has ever stood before any Court(s) in Idaho and explained
any of their unconstitutional deeds subjected upon the defendant/
appellant."
The appellant asserts that "He has amply litigated both [d]eficiancy and prejudice thrusted upon him by the judicial representatives from criminal trial - up to - appellant's [prose] representation and litigation(s) attempts." When, on appeal, the discovery
of an illegal conviction and sentence, no courts, can allow such
unconstitutional acts to [s]tand -- uncorrected. King v. State,
114 Idaho 442,447, 757 P.2d 705,710 (Ct. App. 1988).
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CONCLUSION
For th~ foregoing reasons, the Appellant respectfully asserts
that he has ~uffered from the effects of. ineffective assistance
of counsel. The district court Is D~:tNIA:L:of the SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION.APPLICATION, MEMORANDUM OF LAW IN SUPPORT OF
POSTCONVICTION R,ELIEF, MOTroN :f'.OR RECONSIDERATION, and MOTION
FOR EVIDENTIARY HEARING w/the ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL must be
REVERSED. Thi'S· ·!I0no~ao],,e court· to REMAND to the district court
and ORDER that the SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE POSTCONVICTION APPLICATION be ISSUED and a EVIDENTIARY HEARING be CONDUCTED within
ninty (90) days, if not sooner.
Furthermore, the Appellant seeks full compensation for [all]
litigation cost(s) pretaining to this APPEAL.

DECLARATION UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY

I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY under the laws of the United
States of America that the foregoing is true and correct.
28

u.s.c.,

§1746;

18

u.s.c.

§1621.

Respectfully submitted this ,;:79 t_/2 day of0CWl:FR._ , 201 4.
Executed at: Idaho Correctional Institution - Orofino

prose.
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this~day
of~~
,2014.

~,&,

N tary Publ'c for Idaho
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ommission expires:

RONALD RAY HENRY
REG. NO. 81634
ICIO
381 W. Hospital Dr.
Orofino,ID. 83544
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

/)yl!,
~,
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 0 - day of ljCm/3f/:.

, 2014, I

delivered to prison authorities for the purpose of mailing a true
and correct copy of the APPELLANT'S BRIEF via prison mail system
for process to the U.S. mail system to:

Lawrence G. Wadsen
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Law Division
P.O. Box 83720
Boise,ID.

83720-0010

Clerk Of The Courts
Supreme Court - Court Of Appeals
P.O. Box 83720
Boise,ID.

83720-0101
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